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OF CHARITIES AND CLAWBACKS: THE EUROPEAN UNION
PROPOSAL ON SUCCESSIONS AND WILLS AS A THREAT TO
CHARITABLE GIVING
Aaron Schwabach*
In the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent the United States, an
inter vivos gift, once given, cannot be reclaimed by the giver's
heirs. In civil law countries the situation is quite different: Not
only spouses, but issue and in some cases even ascendants, are
entitled to a forced share of a decedent's estate - and these forced
shares are assessed against a notional "estate" that includes the
testator's inter vivos gifts. If the total of these forced shares
exceeds the amount actually available in the decedent's estate at
death, the recipients of the gifts, or their successors, may be forced
to make up the missing amount.
Clawbacks of this nature might have remained relatively
insignificant, but last year the European Union undertook,
indirectly, to expand their reach dramatically. The EU proposal,
in theory, addresses only conflict of law rules; in practice, if
adopted, it will threaten not only existing trusts and charitable
gifts in the US and UK, but may also reduce future philanthropic
giving. The UK, to date, has opted out of the proposal, and the US
is not directly affected; given the large number of US and UK
citizens with assets in continental Europe, however, and vice
versa, it remains a concern.
The recent European Union proposal to bring about a more
uniform body of law governing choice-of-law and related issues in
international inheritance cases is perhaps, a necessary response to
the increasingly international nature of the EU's (and the world's)
inhabitants and their assets. As written, though, it is rather
heavily tilted toward the civil law values of continental Europe
and threatens to collide jarringly with common law traditions, in
particular the Anglo-American fondness for trusts and charitable
giving. This article provides a look at these different traditions,
and then examines the relevant inheritance law provisions of EU
member states, the UK, and the US before looking at the proposal
itself
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The recent European Union proposal to bring about a more uniform body of law
governing choice-of-law and related issues in international inheritance cases is,
perhaps, a necessary response to the increasingly international nature of the E.U.'s
(and the world's) inhabitants and their assets. As written, though, it is rather heavily
tilted toward the civil law values of continental Europe and threatens to collide
jarringly with common law traditions, in particular the Anglo-American fondness for
trusts and charitable giving. This Article first explores these different traditions, next
examines the relevant inheritance law provisions of E.U. member states, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, and then considers the E.U. proposal.
' Commission Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement ofDecisions and Authentic instruments in
Matters ofSuccession and the Creation ofa European Certificate ofSuccession, COM (2009) 154 final
(Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/stl4/stl4722.enO9.pdf
[hereinafter EU Proposal].
OF CHARITIES AND CLAWBACKS
1. BILL GATES' "GIVING PLEDGE" AND CONTRASTING CULTURES OF
PHILANTHROPY
In June 2010, Bill Gates, the richest person in the U.S. (and sometimes in the
world), introduced his "giving pledge," asking his fellow billionaires to join him in
pledging to give away the majority of their wealth to charity.2 He was
enthusiastically joined by dozens of fellow U.S. billionaires;' their European
counterparts, however, were less enthusiastic. Germany's Peter Kramer found the
pledge "highly problematic."4 Because some charitable contributions can be partially
deducted from U.S. income taxes, Kramer said, the wealthy have a choice: "Would I
rather donate, or pay taxes?"5 He also opined that private philanthropy could not, and
should not, take the place of the state.
Oddly, considering that Kramer himself is a generous donor to schools in
Africa, he thought the billionaires of the United States might do better to subsidize
struggling local governments: "we must not forget that the U.S. has a desolate social
system . . . A greater act of Mr. Gates and Mr. Buffett would have been to give the
money to small communities in the U.S. for the fulfillment of public functions." Of
course, much charitable giving in the United States is done in exactly this way for
public schools, libraries, hospitals, and other governmental services.
An unnamed asset manager for another German billionaire offered a different
reason for the lack of interest shown by his compatriots: "[flor most people that is
too ostentatious[.]"' This may not, however, be a universally shared aversion. For
instance, avoiding the public eye (as well as, perhaps, charity) seems to have been
far from the mind of U.K. billionaire Alki David when he offered $100,000 to
anyone prepared to strip naked in front of President Obama. 9
Outside Germany, some were even more unkind. U.K. columnist Peter Wilby
saw the pledge in old-fashioned class struggle terms: "[t]heir generosity ... helps to
legitimise inequality and head off political protest. Some of them may become even
richer, because charitable giving is good marketing and, sometimes, can be used to
2 See, e.g., Keeping Up with the Gateses: The World's Leading Philanthropists Ask Other
Tycoons to Join Their Movement, ECONOMIST, June 19, 2010, at 72, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16381387; THE GIVING PLEDGE, http:/givingpledge.org (last visited
March 16, 2011) [hereinafter Pledges].
Pledges, supra note 2.
iichstproblematisch, DER SPIEGEL, Aug. 9, 2010, at 58, available at http://www.spiegel.de/
spiegel/ print/d-73107850.html; see also Deutsche Millarddre lassen Gates abblitzen, SPIEGEL ONLINE
(Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,710680,00.html.
iichstproblematisch, supra note 4 ("Spende ich lieber, oder zahle ich Steuern?"). Unless
otherwise noted, all translations (and inaccuracies) are my own.
6 Id.
Id. ("[M]an darfnicht vergessen, dass die USA ein desolates Sozialsystem haben ... Eine
groBere Tat von den Herren Gates oder Buffett wftre es gewesen, das Geld kleinen Gemeinden in den
USA zur Erfilllung von offentlichen Aufgaben zu geben.").
Negative Reaction to Charity Campaign: German Millionaires Criticize Gates' Giving Pledge,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,710972,00.html.
' Patrick Allen, $100,000 to Go Naked in Front ofPresident Obama, CNBC (Aug. 12, 2010),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/38670867/100_000_toGo Naked in Front of President Obama.
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tie recipients into buying the donors' products and services."' 0 Wilby's argument
was somewhat undercut by a misunderstanding of U.S. income tax law: "[L]et's be
clear. Money paid to charity is exempt from tax . . . Those who already wield
enormous economic power can determine social priorities too. Of course, the poor
also contribute to charity but most don't get the tax breaks because they don't pay
income tax."" In fact, the (partial) tax break for charitable donations is perhaps
actually more valuable to the middle-class taxpayers than to the very wealthy, whose
deductions are limited and whose immediate financial need to cut their tax bills is
less pressing.
A. Different Cultures of Philanthropy
It seems unlikely, though, that anyone would question the assertion that
different cultures of philanthropy exist in the United States and Europe, especially
continental Europe. The people of the United States contribute nearly two percent of
the country's GDP to charities each year, a rate four or more times as high as that in
most of continental Europe.' 2 The existence of a charitable-giving deduction in the
U.S. tax code is often cited as a reason.13 But that by itself seems insufficient; the tax
code, as noted by Mr. Wilby, provides no incentive to the low-income families who
donate an even higher proportion of their income to charity than their wealthier
compatriots, and little incentive to the wealthy, whose tax relief from charitable
contributions may be limited. In fact, a 2006 survey of wealthy donors found most
claiming that the presence or absence of tax incentives had no impact on their
decisions.14
Nor do broader cultural factors alone seem sufficient to explain the disparity.
Notwithstanding the delight Americans and western Europeans alike take in
discovering and exaggerating cultural differences, in reality the differences are not
all that great. And while the level of government-provided social services is higher
in most European countries than in the United States, that does not eliminate the
need for domestic charitable giving in those countries and should have no effect at
all on international giving.
1o Peter Wilby, The Rich Want a Better World? Try Paying Fair Wages and Tax, GUARDIAN,
Aug. 6, 2010, at 31, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/aug/05/
philanthropy-does-not-pay-taxes.
" Id.
12 See, e.g., CHARITIES AID FOUNDATION, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF CHARITABLE
Giving 6, 9, 13 (2006), http://www.cafonline.org/pdfntemrnational%/ 20Comparisons%/o20
of%/20Charitable%/ 20Giving.pdf; Americans Give Record $295B to Charity, USA TODAY (June 25,
2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-06-25-charitable N.htm ("In philanthropic
giving as a percentage of gross domestic product, the U.S. ranked first at 1.7%. No. 2 Britain gave 0.73%,
while France, with a 0.14% rate, trailed such countries as South Africa, Singapore, Turkey and
Germany.").
See, e.g., Doing Well and Doing Good: Why a New, Golden Age ofPhilanthropy May Be
Dawning, ECONOMIST, July 29, 2004, at 61, available at http://www.economist.com/node/2963247?
story id=2963247; The Giving Game: Some Easy Ways for the Government to Encourage More Giving,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2010, at 68, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17259045?
story id=17259045.
14 Mark Trumbull, America the Charitable: A Few Surprises, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Nov. 27, 2006, at 1, available athttp://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1127/pOlsOl usec.html.
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While all of these factors-taxation, government services, and cultural
differences play a part, there may be others as well. Much American charitable
giving is done by bequest, including the popular planned-giving options that allow a
donor to continue to receive the income from a gift during his or her life. It may be
that charitable giving by bequest is less frequently done in Europe because it is often
not possible, or at least restricted, under the legal system of most European
countries.
B. Difficulty or Impossibility Under Many European Countries' Inheritance
Laws
In most of the countries of the European Union, the United Kingdom aside, it is
more or less impossible for a testator with living children to deny those children a
share of the estate. Forced heirship laws protect children who have been left less than
their legally-determined share; a bequest to a charitable organization will fail if it
cuts into this protected share. Even testators without children may have no choice
but to leave a substantial portion of their estate to certain other surviving relatives.
Nor can the problem be avoided by an inter vivos gift: many E.U. countries also
have "clawback" laws, which allow heirs to reclaim gifts given during the testator's
lifetime.
Analogues of forced heirship exist in other forms in the Anglo-American legal
tradition; the idea that it should be difficult for a testator to completely disinherit a
spouse (or, in some cases, a child) might be one many U.K. and U.S. lawyers would
disagree with, but it is unlikely to shock. Clawbacks are a different matter; with a
few minor exceptions, the idea is alien to the legal systems of England and Wales. In
the United States, where clawbacks remain a theoretical possibility in many states,
they are rare-the reaction of an American or British lawyer (to say nothing of a
client) encountering clawbacks for the first time is likely to be stunned disbelief.
Clawbacks seem rooted in a completely different view of property; in common law
terms, it might be said that clawbacks assume a world in which every property owner
is but a life tenant.
For centuries these inconsistent views of property and inheritance have existed
with little interaction; to U.K. and, to a lesser extent, U.S. lawyers clawbacks were a
vaguely horrifying but comfortingly irrelevant oddity, found somewhere safely
beyond the borders. But the increasing interconnectedness of the world's peoples
and legal systems are diminishing that comforting distance. Today tens of millions,
or even hundreds of millions, of people live, work, marry, have children, and acquire
and dispose of property in more than one country. A charity in the United Kingdom
or the United States that accepts a large gift may find itself embroiled in litigation
decades-perhaps even a century- later, if the donor dies leaving an estate
governed by (or at least subject to a plausible, not instantly dismissible argument that
it is governed by) another country's inheritance laws.
In the European Union, there are now nearly half a million multistate
successions-situations in which a decedent leaves assets in more than one
2011] 451
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country each year.' 5 The free movement of people and property post-Maastricht
makes it likely that this number will continue to rise. The E.U. may strive toward a
single system of civil justice, accommodating local variations but eliminating the
uncertainties and inconsistent results of the current regime. 16 The United States has
managed (more or less) to achieve such a system, which spanns a large part of a
continent, but it has taken over two centuries and complexities still arise in multi-
state inheritance cases. In addition, the states of the United States share language,
cultural expectations, and, for the most part, concepts of property and inheritance
rooted in the Anglo-American common law; the countries of Europe are far more
different from each other, and in some cases their expectations may prove
incompatible. Even the shorter-term solution of a harmonized system of choice of
inheritance law may prove unattainable, especially (as discussed below) to the extent
that the participation of the United Kingdom is necessary.
I. DIFFERENCES IN INHERITANCE LAWS
A. Forced Heirship and Clawbacks
It may be useful to begin by examining the laws of E.U. member states
regarding forced heirship and clawbacks. Two concepts will help in understanding
the operation of clawbacks, each of which has analogues in U.S. law: (1) the legitim
or reserve, and (2) the fictive hereditary mass. Neither of these terms is used
universally; in this Article they will be substituted, where appropriate, for the terms
in local use.
The legitim or reserve is the portion of the estate subject to forced heirship-
that is, the portion the testator is not free to dispose of as he or she wishes but which
must pass instead to persons within a small category of close relatives, typically
issue, ancestors, and spouse. In the United States, a spouse's elective share of an
estate'7 also limits a testator's freedom to dispose of his or her property by will;
forced heirship is thus not an alien concept to U.S. lawyers, although it would be a
mistake to conclude that the forced heirship provisions of any country are identical
to those of any other. The problem is perhaps best expressed in an addendum to the
E.U. proposal:
All Member States except for the UK (specifically, England and Wales)
grant a compulsory share of the inheritance to close family members,
regardless of any testamentary dispositions by the deceased. This share,
the "statutory reserve", can amount to between 25 and 100% of the
1 Where There's a Will There's a Roiw, ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 2009, at 65, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/14644403.
16 See, e.g., Sinplification of Regulation on International Successions (MEMO/09/447), EUROPA
(Oct. 14, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/447&
format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage-en.
17 Under Uniform Probate Code, a surviving spouse's elective share is half of the augmented
estate or $75,000, whichever is more, and subject to certain exceptions and allowances. UNIFORM PROB.
CODE § 2 202 (amended 2008), [8 Pt. I] U.L.A. 76 (Supp. 2010).
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inheritance, depending on the applicable law and the number of remaining
family members, and also varies widely between the Member States. "
The fictive hereditary mass is the combined value of the decedent's assets and
some or all inter vivos gifts made by the decedent, less debts.19 In countries applying
clawbacks, the forced heirship share is assessed not as a percentage of the decedent's
estate but as a percentage of the fictive hereditary mass. To complicate matters
further, not all inter vivos gifts are included in the fictive hereditary mass, but the
excluded gifts vary from one country to the next. Again, this concept-the fictive
hereditary mass-has its analogue in the U.S. concept of the augmented estate,
which can include some of the testator's inter vivos gifts. 20
In the United States, however, there is at least an initial tendency to view gifts
once given, as gone, although there are some exceptions. 21 The expectations of U.S.
donees are thus at odds with those of non-U.S., potential forced heirs. The effect of
this clash of expectations, expressed in actions to claw back charitable donations and
assets placed in trust, is potentially disastrous: A donor might give three quarters of
her wealth to, say, the San Diego Zoo, then live another sixty years. In some
countries, her descendants might be able to claw back part of that money up to thirty
years after the date of death-ninety years after the original gift. A California court
might, of course, refuse to recognize the judgment, although the Zoo's assets in other
countries, if any, might become vulnerable to it.
Should pressure from the E.U. ultimately bring the United Kingdom to opt in to
the current proposal (or a future proposal) to reform cross-border successions, courts
in the United Kingdom might find they lack the option of refusing to enforce the
judgment. The E.U., in material accompanying its current proposal, presents a
similar hypothetical:
Example: An Englishman has invested most of his wealth in a collection
of modern art paintings, which he gives away to a museum. Shortly
thereafter, he moves to France, where he eventually marries a French
woman, and the couple have two children who are also French citizens.
When the father passes away years later, the children under the applicable
French law of succession are entitled to a statutory share of the
inheritance, which in this example would amount to 3 of the estate. For
the purposes of calculating the value of that share, the value of the estate
of the deceased including all gifts made during his lifetime is calculated.
Assuming that the value of the collection of paintings amounts to 12 of the
estate's total value, the statutory share cannot be satisfied by the
" Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction, Applicable Laiw, Recognition and Enforcement
of Decisions and Authentic Instruments in Matters of Successions and on the Introduction ofa European
Certificate of Inheritance, at 9, SEC (2009) 410 final (Oct. 20, 2009), available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/stl4/stl4722-ad0l.enO9.pdf [hereinafter Addendum 1].
" See PAUL DELNOY, LES LIBERALITES ET LES SUCCESSIONS 237 (1st ed. 1991).
20 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-203 (amended 2008), [8 Pt. 1] 8 U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 2010); id. § 2-
205 (amended 2008), [8 Pt. I] U.L.A. 82 (Supp. 2010).
21 See, e.g., 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 4 (2010) ("As a general rule, natural persons have the right to
give away their property to whomsoever they wish and if they do so, and the gift is not induced by fraud
or undue influence; only the creditors of the person who makes the gift may impeach it." (citing In re
Conservatorship of Spindle, 733 P.2d 388 (Okla. 1986))).
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remaining assets in the estate. In this case, the children can bring a so-
called 'claim for reduction' against the museum, forcing it to pay the
remaining 1/6 of the estate to complete the statutory share of the
children.22
Even the countries that permit clawbacks permit them under widely varying
terms; courts in France may be nearly as shocked by the extent of clawbacks under
Bulgarian law as courts in the United States or United Kingdom might be.
Accordingly, a brief look at the provisions of some member states is helpful.
1. E.U. Member States (Other Than the United Kingdom)
The list that follows addresses the older members of the E.U., with Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Malta and Poland representing the newer (post-2000) members.23 Law is, of
course, fluid everywhere. Inheritance law has recently been a hot topic in such major
E.U. players as France and Germany, and it seems safe to assume that there will
be-or in some cases already have been-changes in the laws of at least some of the
countries described below.
a. Austria
Austria takes a broad view of the persons to whom a forced inheritance share
(gezetzlicher Pflichtteil) should be granted: not only a testator's children, but all
descendants generally, may be entitled to a forced share in the decedent's estates, as
well as the decedent's spouse.24 In the absence of issue, the decedent's ancestors
may claim a share. 25 The forced share of spouse and descendants is, as in many
countries, equal to one-half the intestate share.26 The forced share of the ancestors, in
27the absence of issue, is equal to one-third the intestate share. Gifts to potential heirs
are included in the fictive hereditary mass no matter when given; other gifts,
including to charities, are included only if given within the last two years of the
testator's life. 28 As in many countries, potential heirs can waive their forced shares
during the life of the testator. Such waiver must be in a writing satisfying the
requirements of a contract under Austrian law.29
b. Belgium
In Belgium, a decedent's children have forced heirship rights; if the children
predecease the testator, the grandchildren may claim forced heirship shares.30 If the
2' Addendum 1, supra note 18, at 16.
23 For the inheritance laws of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia, see ERBRECHT IN EUROPA (2d ed. 2008).
24 ALLGEMEINES BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] JUSTIZGESETZSAMMLUNG
[JGS] No.946/1816, as amended, § 764 (Austria).
25 Id. § 764.
26 Id. § 765.
27 Id. § 766.
28 Franz Haunschmidt, Erbrecht in Osterreich, in ERBRECHT IN EUROPA, supra note 23, at 1089,
1099.
29 Andreas Lintl, Austria, in EUROPEAN SUCCESsIoN LAWS 23, 33 (David Hayton ed., 2d ed.
2002).
" CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 914 (Belg.).
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decedent has one child, that child's forced heirship share is one-half the fictive
hereditary mass.' Two children will each take one-third of the fictive hereditary
mass, for a total of two-thirds.32 Three children each take one-fourth, for a total of
three-fourths. The total amount of the estate subject to forced heirship never exceeds
three-fourths; where there are more than three children, three-fourths of the fictive
hereditary mass is divided among them.3 In the absence of issue, the testator's
surviving parents (but not other ancestors) may each claim a one-fourth share-half
of the estate for two surviving parents or one-fourth for one.34
With up to three-fourths of the fictive hereditary mass subject to forced heirship,
the potential for clawback actions is considerable; inter vivos gifts totaling more than
one-fourth of the donor's wealth, let alone the 99% Warren Buffett has given or
proposes to give away, would be vulnerable.
Even more alarmingly from an Anglo-American point of view, Belgium's
forced heirship laws appear to include all inter vivos gifts within the fictive
hereditary mass; a gift given early in the donor's life might still be vulnerable when
the testator dies of extreme old age. One limiting factor, though, is adverse
possession: under Belgian law, the period for adverse possession is thirty years,3
after which a donee could presumably perfect title if the other requirements were
met. As adverse possession does not run against one's spouse under Belgian law,
however, where a surviving spouse has forced heirship rights, the period might not
run until thirty years after the testator's death.37 And, in the case of non-fungible
assets (such as real property), the holder of the forced heirship right might be able to
reclaim the property not only from the original donee but from remote grantees-
that is, from someone, even a bona fide purchaser for value who obtained the
property from the original donee, as well as that person's subsequent grantees.,
c. Bulgaria
Bulgarian law, interestingly, accords equal forced heirship shares to surviving
children and any surviving spouse.3 9 That is, two surviving children (in the absence
of a surviving spouse) or a surviving spouse and surviving child each hold a one-
third share of the fictive hereditary mass, for a total of two-thirds.40 Three or more
surviving children divide two-thirds of the fictive hereditary mass among
themselves,4 ' while two surviving children and a surviving spouse fare slightly
better, each taking one-fourth.42 Three or more surviving children and a surviving
' Id. art. 913.
3 Id. art. 913.
3 Id. art. 913.
" Id. art. 915.
1 Id. art. 922.
31 Id. arts. 2244, 2258, 2262.
' See id. art. 2253; see also U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION PROPOSAL ON
SUCCESSION AND WILLS-APUBLIC CONSULTATION 31 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/
consultations/docs/ec-succession-wills.pdf [hereinafter MOJ WILLS CONSULTATION PAPER].
* CODE CIVIL [C. Clv.] art. 930 (BeIg.).
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spouse divide five-sixths of the fictive hereditary mass, leaving only one-sixth to be
otherwise disposed of either inter vivos or by will. 43 There does not appear to be any
time limit on inter vivos gifts to be included in the fictive hereditary mass, although
the most recent gifts are the first to be reduced.44
d. Cyprus
Cyprus, under British administration for more than eighty years in the twentieth
and late nineteenth centuries, apparently imbibed the British aversion to clawbacks.
British common law infiltrated the preexisting Ottoman legal system from 1878
onward and displaced it more or less completely from 1935 through independence in
1960.45 Cyprus allows forced heirship shares for a testator's spouse and children and,
in their absence, for certain other family members, but the concept of fictive
46hereditary mass is absent. The forced heirship shares are based solely on the value
of the testator's estate at the time of death.47
e. Denmark
Denmark, unusual among continental European countries, appears not to apply
the concept of fictive hereditary mass. Gifts given to a potential heir as an advance
on inheritance may be added to the notional value of the estate, but inter vivos gifts
generally are not. 48 Gifts causa mortis, however, must be given in the form of a
will.4 9 A surviving spouse and issue may claim forced shares equal to half of the
estate. Where a spouse alone survives, the spouse may claim the entire amount;
where issue alone survive, they divide the amount among them per stirpes.5 0 Where
a spouse and issue survive, the spouse takes one-third of the amount (or one-sixth of
the total) with the issue dividing the remaining two-thirds (or one-third of the total
estate) among them per stirpes.52 Because these shares are not assessed against a
fictive hereditary mass, however, there are no clawbacks.
f. Finland
Under Finnish law only issue may be forced heirs, and a testator may explicitly
disinherit a potential forced heir. Each forced heir may take half the share he or she
4 MOJ WILLS CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 37, at 32; Ivanova, supra note 39, at 401-03.
" MOJ WILLS CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 37, at 32.
45 See Andreas Neocleous & David Bevir, Legal History, in INTRODUCTION TO CYPRUS LAW 1,
11-12 (Dennis Campbell ed., 2000).
46See MOJ WILLS CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 37, at 27, 32; Lefkios Tsikkinis, Law of
Succession, in INTRODUCTION TO CYPRUS LAW, supra note 45, at 617, 635.
4 See MOJ WILLS CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 37, at 32; see Tsikkinis, supra note 46, at
635.
4 J. Qviste, Denmark, in EUROPEAN SUCCESSION LAWS, supra note 29, at 185, 192.
49 id.
5o Id. at 188.
51id.
52 id.
5 Urpo Kangas, Finlande, in COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY ON RULES OF CONFLICTS OF
JURISDICTION AND CONFLICTS OF LAW CONCERNING WILLS AND SUCCESSIONS IN THE MEMBER STATES
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 337, 367 (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/doc-centre/
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would have received had the estate passed by intestacy.5 4 The time limit for a forced
share claim is measured from the time the heir is informed of the will; he or she has
six months from that date to claim the forced share.55 A clawback action has a
somewhat longer statute of limitations-such an action must be brought within one
year from the time the heir is informed of the testator's death or within ten years of
the testator's death, whichever is sooner. 56 The testator's inter vivos gifts, subject to
some exceptions, are taken into account in calculating the fictive hereditary mass
against which forced shares are assessed,5 and gifts to a forced heir are taken into
account in assessing that heir's forced share.
g. France
French law provides forced heirship rights for a testator's spouse and
descendants, or, in the absence of issue, the testator's ancestors. 59 The fictive
hereditary mass includes inter vivos gifts,o unless consented to in advance by the
61
potential forced heirs. If the estate is insufficient to satisfy the forced heirship
claims, the testator's inter vivos gifts may be clawed back in reverse chronological
order, so long as the clawback is pursued within five years of the rightholder's
discovery that the property has been given to someone else or within ten years of the
62date of the testator's death, whichever is sooner.
h. Germany
Germany's forced heirship provisions are similar to Austria's. 6 ' In Germany,
forced heirship shares (Pflichttei) protect the inheritance rights of a testator's
spouse,64 descendants, and in the absence of these persons, the testator's parents, if
living. 5 Each of these persons, if entitled to take a forced share, takes half the share
he or she would have received had the estate passed by intestate succession. The
fictive hereditary mass includes gifts made to persons (other than potential forced
heirs) within the last ten years of the testator's life.66 Some gifts to potential forced
heirs may also be included-even if made more than ten years before the testator's
civil/studies/doc/report conflits finland.pdf; Zacharias Sundstrom, Finland, in EUROPEAN SUCCESSION
LAWS, supra note 29, at 197, 200.





51 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 913 914-1 (Fr.).
6o Id. art. 920.
61 PHILIPPE MALAURIE, LES SUCCESSIONS: LES LIBERALITES 315-316 (2d ed. 2006).
62 id.
61 See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
64 Germany, like many other EU member states, does not recognize same-sex marriage; however,
Germany's Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz accords a registered domestic partner (Eingetragene
Lebenspartner) the same rights as a spouse in most matters. The word "spouse" is used for convenience
throughout these articles, without intending to imply anything about the rights of domestic partners, the
law regarding whom is in flux nearly everywhere.
65 BtJRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, DAs BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL.] 42, as amended, § 2303 (Ger.).
6 BGB, Jan. 2, 2002, BGBL. 42, as amended, § 2325, 3 (Ger.).
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death. A gift to the testator's spouse is included in the fictive hereditary mass, no
matter when it was made.6 ' Forced shares, including clawbacks, if any, must be
exercised within three years of the rightholder's discovery that the property has been
given to someone else or within thirty years of the date of the testator's death,
whichever is sooner. In contrast to the situation in, for example, Belgium, third
parties who receive property in good faith from a donee are not subject to the
clawback and cannot be required to pay; the remedy is available only directly against
the donee.70
i. Greece
In Greece, a testator's spouse and children, or in the absence of children, other
descendants, or in the absence of any issue, ancestors, are entitled to a forced share
equal to half of what each would have received had the estate passed by intestacy.
The fictive hereditary mass includes all inter vivos gifts to potential forced heirs,
plus all other inter vivos gifts made within the last ten years of the testator's life,
subject to certain exceptions.72 In the event a gift is clawed back, the donee has the
option to return the property or pay its value.
j. Ireland
Ireland allows forced heirship shares only to surviving spouses; however, in the
case of omission or deliberate disinheritance of a child, a court may disregard that
omission and award the child a share in the estate.74 There is no fictive hereditary
mass or clawback provision.
k. Italy
The Italian Civil Code provides forced heirship rights to a testator's spouse and
children, or in the absence of children, other descendants, or in the absence of any
issue, ancestors.76 Peculiarly, the Code draws a distinction between figli legittimi
(legitimate children) and figli naturali (illegitimate-literally "natural"-children).77
In modem times there seems to be no difference in the forced heirship rights of the
67 Id.
68 Id.
'9 BGB, Jan. 2, 2002, BGBL. 42, as amended, §§ 195, 197, 2332 (Ger.).
7 See MOJ WILLS CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 37, at 36; see also notes 35 38, supra, and
accompanying text.
n ASTIKOs KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] 5:1825 (Greece).
72 Id. 5:1831.
n Id. 5:1836.
7 See generally Matheson Ormsby Prentice, Ireland, in COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY ON RULES
OF CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION AND CONFLICTS OF LAW CONCERNING WILLS AND SUCCESSIONS IN THE
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 463, 493 (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice
/doc centre/civil/studies/doc/report conflits ireland.pdf.
7 Id. at 492 93.
6 CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] art. 536 (It.).
7 Id. Or, as Will Cuppy says, "All children are natural, but some are more so than others and are
therefore known as natural children." WILL Cuppy, Lucrezia Borgia, in THE DECLINE AND FALL OF
PRACTICALLY EVERYBODY: GREAT FIGURES OF HISTORY HILARIOUSLY HUMBLED 97 (1950).
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two groups, although in the case of ancestors, only legitimate ancestors (ascendenti
legittimi) may claim a share.79
A surviving spouse or child may claim one-half of the fictive hereditary mass;
two or more children divide two-thirds among them.so Where a spouse alone
survives, the spouse takes one-half;, where a spouse and one child survive, each
takes one-third, while where a spouse and multiple children survive, the spouse takes
one-fourth and the children divide one-half among themselves.82 Where a spouse and
legitimate ancestors survive, the spouse takes one-half while the ancestors divide
one-fourth among them.83 If legitimate ancestors alone survive, they divide one-third
among them.84
In all cases, the forced shares are based on the fictive hereditary mass, which
includes all inter vivos gifts by the testator whenever made, subject to a few
exceptions.85 Potential holders of forced heirship rights cannot waive these rights at
the time of the gift, although they may do so after the testator's death. 6 Gifts are
clawed back in reverse chronological order and while there seems to be a preference
for in-kind restoration, donees may opt to pay the value of the property instead.7 In
most cases, property is clawed back free of any liens or mortgages placed upon it by
the donee."
1. Luxembourg
Under the law of Luxembourg, only children may take as forced heirs; however,
if a child is ineligible to take, has predeceased the testator, or has renounced any
share in the estate, that child's descendants may take the share.89 A single child, or
descendants exercising that child's right, takes half the fictive hereditary mass; two
children divide two-thirds, while three or more divide three-fourths. 90 A surviving
spouse may either take a share as a child, or may claim a usufruct in all the real and
personal property jointly possessed and occupied by the couple during the testator's
life.91All of the testator's inter vivos gifts are taken into account in determining the
7 See C.C. art. 536 (It.).
7 Id.
so Id. arts. 537, 540.
8 Id. art. 540.
82 Id. art. 542.
Id. art. 544.
1 Id art. 538.




Jean-Claude Wiwinius, Luxembourg, in COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY ON RULES OF CONFLICTS
OF JURISDICTION AND CONFLICTS OF LAW CONCERNING WILLS AND SUCCESSIONS IN THE MEMBER
STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 539, 569 (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/.
doc centre/civil/studies/doc/report conflits luxembourg.pdf
90 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 913 (Lux.).
9 This right covers "I'immeuble habite en commun par les 6poux et des meubles meublants le
garnissant, A condition que l'immeuble ait appartenu au defunt en totalite ou coniointement avec le
survivant." Id art. 767-1.
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fictive hereditary mass, apparently without exception.92 No time limit is set in the
Code Civil or in Luxembourg's case law during which clawback rights must be
exercised. However, Jean-Claude Wiwinius believes it probable that Luxembourg,
with its version of the Napoleonic Code, will follow the lead of France and apply an
upper limit of thirty years.9 It remains to be seen whether Luxembourg will now
apply the shorter period recently adopted by France. It may be worth noting that the
prescriptive period under Luxembourg law is ten, twenty, or thirty years, depending
on the type of property involved and several other factors.9 4
m. Malta
Malta's experience with British rule was twice as long as that of Cyprus. Yet
unlike Cyprus, Malta retains the concept of fictive hereditary mass, including within
it all inter vivos gifts made by the testator to any person,95 subject to several
exceptions. 96 A person claiming forced heirship must, of course, exclude from the
claimed share any gifts given to himself or herself.97 The assignment of forced
heirship is complex. Four or fewer surviving children divide one-third of the fictive
hereditary mass among themselves; five or more divide one-half. 9 Note that this
produces the odd result that four children would each have a one-twelfth, or 8.33%,
share, while five children would each have a one tenth, or 10.00%, share, and each
of the six children would have the same individual share as each of the four.
Like Italy, Malta distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate children.
Until 2004, it also discriminated; illegitimate children received a lesser share than
legitimate children. 99 Where children predecease their testator, their children-the
testator's grandchildren-take from the testator per stirpes. 100
The legacy of 164 years of British administration can be seen both in the
unusual complexity of Malta's forced heirship and other inheritance laws,
incorporating common law and civil law concepts, and also in provisions allowing a
testator, in certain fairly broadly defined circumstances, to disinherit a person who
would otherwise have been entitled to forced heirship rights. i0i
If a spouse and children survive, the spouse may claim forced heirship rights in
one-fourth of the fictive hereditary mass.' 02 If the spouse alone survives, he or she
9 See Wiwinius, supra note 89, at 570 ("Toutes les lib6ralites consenties par le defunt sont prises
en consideration pour le calcul de la reserve, quels que sojent la qualit6 du gratifi6, I'objet de la liberalit6
ou sa forme.").
9 See id. ("En principe, le droit a la reserve ne se prescrit pas. Il n'existe pas de jurisprudence
luxembourgeoise a ce sujet. Mais on pourrait concevoir, en s'inspirant de la jurisprudence frangaise (cf.
rapport frangais), que la prescription de droit commun de trente ans, a compter de l'ouverture de la
succession, s'applique.").
" CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] arts. 2262, 2265 (Lux.); see also id arts. 2262-81.
95 CIVIL CODE [C. Civ.] art. 620(3) (Malta).
9' Id. art. 620.
17 Id. art. 620(4).
9 Id. art. 616.
9' See id. arts. 640-46 (repealed 2004).
'o Id. arts. 618(2), 801-07.
... Id arts. 622 23, 625-30.
1 2Id. art. 631.
460 [Vol. 17
OF CHARITIES AND CLAWBACKS
may claim one-third.' 03 The surviving spouse also receives a life tenancy as a
usufructuary beneficiary in the property occupied by the spouse and testator as
their principal residence at the time of the testator's death.10 4 An action to clawback
gifts through forced heirship must be brought within ten years of the opening of the
succession."o0
n. Netherlands
While most E.U. countries allow a variety of relatives to exercise forced
heirship rights, in the Netherlands, only descendants may be forced heirs. 1o6 Each
child (or, if a child predeceases the testator, that child's issue) takes half the share the
child would have received had the estate passed by intestacy.io7 Shares are calculated
based on the fictive hereditary mass, which includes gifts made to forced heirs
during the testator's life and gifts made to others in the last five years of the
testator's life, in both cases subject to some exceptions.ios Forced heirship rights
must be exercised within five years of the testator's death.109
o. Poland
Poland follows a more typical model; forced heirship shares are available to the
testator's spouse and descendants and, in the absence of issue, ancestors.110 The
share awarded to these persons is somewhat less than usual; each receives a forced
heirship right equal to just one-third of the intestate share unless he or she is a minor
or unable to work, in which case he or she receives the more usual one-half." All of
these amounts are based on a fictive hereditary mass that includes most inter vivos
gifts to potential forced heirs throughout the testator's life, gifts to others within the
last ten years of the testator's life, and, in the case of forced heirship rights of
descendants, gifts made less than three hundred days prior to the birth of the
testator's first child. 112
p. Portugal
In Portugal, as in many other countries, forced heirship rights extend to the
testator's spouse and descendants, and in the absence of surviving issue, the
ancestors."' Where there is a surviving spouse but no descendants, the Legitima-
the portion subject to forced heirship-equals half of the fictive hereditary mass; in
other words, the spouse takes half."l 4 Where a spouse and one or more children




1 Id art. 845(1).
.. BURGERLIJK WETBOEK (CIVIL CODE) [BW] art. 63(2) (Neth.). See generally id. arts. 63 92.
o See MOJ WILLS CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 37, at 42.
.Id arts. 65, 67(e).
..Id. art. 85.
no CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 991 (Pol.). See generally id. arts. 991-99 (forced heirship); arts.
1000-07 (clawbacks).
". MOJ WILLS CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 37, at 45.
112 C. CiV. art. 993, 994 (Pol.); MOJ WILLS CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 37, at 45-46.
" CODIGO CIVIL [C. CIv.] art. 2157 (Port.). See generally id. arts. 2156-78.
H4Id. art. 2158.
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survive, they divide two-thirds of the fictive hereditary mass among themselves."i
When no spouse survives, a sole surviving child takes half while two or more
children divide two-thirds.' 6 Where a child predeceases the testator, that child's
children-the testator's grandchildren-take by representation, as if a share had
passed to them per stirpes.1 1 A spouse and surviving ancestors divide two-thirds
among themselves; if parents but not spouse and children survive, then they divide
one-half, while if other ascendants are the only survivors, then they divide one-
third.118
The fictive hereditary mass includes all inter vivos gifts by the testator, with a
few exceptions, including, wedding gifts, gifts for children's education, and gifts for
maintenance, "to the extent to which they harmonize with the uses and with the
social and economic status of the deceased."'11 9 The class assumptions behind that
last provision might merit closer examination-like the distinctions drawn in some
legal systems between legitimate and illegitimate children, they offer a hint of
underlying social principles. The effective statute of limitations for clawbacks under
Portuguese law is quite limited; they must be exercised, if at all, within two years.120
q. Spain
In Spain, as well, forced heirship rights extend to the testator's spouse and
descendants and, in the absence of surviving issue, ancestors. 121 The size of the
legitima is less flexible than in many other E.U. countries; where it is to be shared
among descendants, it is set at two-thirds the value of the fictive hereditary mass,
regardless of the number of descendants. 122 Where there are surviving ancestors but
no surviving children, the ancestors' share is one-half; where one or more ancestors
share with a surviving spouse, the ancestors' share is one-third.123
The fictive hereditary mass includes all inter vivos gifts by the testator, with a
few exceptions.124 As in most countries, gifts made to a forced heir are counted in
computing the fictive hereditary mass for the benefit of other forced heirs, but are
deducted from the forced share of the heir to whom they were previously given.12
Gifts in excess of one-third to one-half of the fictive hereditary mass may be clawed
back.126 No statute of limitations for clawbacks appears under the heading "De las
legitimas" in the Spanish code, although the general terms of adverse possession
(prescripcidn; six years for personal property 27 and thirty for real property 28 ) might
"' Id. art. 2159.
116 1d.
"'Id. art. 2160.
" Id. art. 2161.
"' Id. art. 2110 ("[N]a medida em que se harmonizern corn os usos e corn a condictio social e
econ6mica do falecido."); see also id art. 2162.
12
1 Id art. 2178.
121 CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 807 (Spain).
122 Id. art. 808.
123 Id. art. 809.
124 d. art. 818.
125d. art. 819.
1
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protect donees and their transferees in some instances. Potential forced heirs may not
waive their rights: "[a]ny waiver or compromise of the future legitim from the future
testator and his or her heirs is void, and they may claim it when s/he dies."' 29 It is not
clear how this interacts with the law of prescripci6n, although the U.K. Ministry of
Justice Consultation Paper takes the view that "[t]he Spanish Civil Code excludes
lifetime discharges of the Legitima and, presumably also, this applies to an exclusion
of a right to recover a gift to pay the Legitima."130 But it may be that, as in several
other countries, the law of prescription (or adverse possession) provides an upper
limit to the time in which clawbacks may be exercised.
r. Sweden
Sweden, like the Netherlands, accords a forced share right only to descendants.
To simplify matters even further, the amount of the fictive hereditary mass subject to
forced heirship-that is, the reserve or legitim-is constant, at one-half of the
total.' 3' Gifts exceeding half of the fictive hereditary mass may be clawed back, but
the clawback must be exercised no later than one year after the inventory of the
estate is completed; note that this will be some time later than one year after the
testator's death.13 2
2. The United Kingdom (England & Wales)
While in theory England and Wales reject the idea of forced heirship, in practice
they provide somewhat analogous rights. Under the Inheritance Act (Provision for
Family and Dependants) of 1975, a court may make provisions for the maintenance
of certain persons from a decedent's estate, even though the decedent omitted them
from his or her will.133 These persons include spouses, and children, as well as
certain persons not generally protected in other countries: former spouses who have
not remarried, the children of spouses (as part of the category "any person (not being
a child of the deceased) who, in the case of any marriage to which the deceased was
at any time a party, was treated by the deceased as a child of the family in relation to
that marriage"), and other former dependents or part-dependents.134
While the potential provision for this rather wide range of persons is not
automatic and thus not truly an elective share in the U.S. sense or forced heirship in
the European sense, it does provide at least a potential constraint on the testator's
29 
Id. art. 816 ("Toda renuncia o transacci6n sobre la legitima futura entre el que la debe y sus
herederos forzosas es nula, y estos podran reclamarla cuando muera aque1.").
1o MOJ WILLS CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 37, at 48.
Id at 48-49 (citing Ernst Johansson, Erbrecht in Schweden, in ERBRECHT IN EUROPA, supra
note 23, at 1277, 1302-04).
1
3 2 Id. at 49.
1 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975, c. 63, §§ 1 2.
4Id. Similar provisions are found throughout the British Commonwealth; in the United States,
provisions of this sort have been rejected as likely to encourage litigation and yield inconsistent results.
E.g., Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the Implications for Inheritance, 48
ARIz. L. REv. 1, 16 (2006).
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freedom to dispose of his or her property. Nor is forced heirship completely alien to
the English common law; it existed in England into the early eighteenth century. 135
3. The United States
The concepts of fictive hereditary mass and forced heirship are not, perhaps, as
alien to U.S. law as to U.K. law. The fictive hereditary mass has its rough
counterpart in the augmented, net, or elective estate, while forced heirship, at least
for spouses, exists in the form of the elective share. Even the clawback may exist
where an elective share based on the augmented, net, or elective estate exceeds the
probate estate-that is, where the testator has transferred more than half of his or her
wealth inter vivos. However, such clawback actions remain vanishingly rare in the
United States.' 6 Mortmain statutes, while they still existed, also acted as defacto
clawbacks, invalidating charitable bequests made shortly before death. 37 And gifts
causa mortis may be revocable under certain circumstances, providing another form
of "stealth clawback." 38
The augmented estate, under Uniform Probate Code § 2-203, includes the net
probate estate as well as the decedent's nonprobate transfers-including inter vivos
gifts-and the surviving spouse's property and inter vivos transfers,139 less funeral
3 Sarah Albury et al., Royaume-Uni: EU Study on the International Law ofSuccession, in
EUROPA JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS-SUCCESSION AND WILLS STUDY 671, 702 (2005),
http://ec.europa.eu/civiliustice/publications/docs/report conflits uk.pdf
3See, e.g., Dreher v. Dreher, 634 S.E.2d 646 (S.C. 2006) (assets previously placed in revocable
inter vivos trust by decedent could be added to value of decedent's estate for purpose of calculating
surviving spouse's elective share; trust was illusory, and its assets could be reached to satisfy the elective
share); Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1984) (assets placed in trust during decedent's life,
with remainder interests in third parties, were not part of decedent's estate for purposes of calculating
elective share); Burns v. Turnbull, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943), aff'd 62 N.E.2d 785 (N.Y. 1945)
(assets placed in revocable inter vivos trust by decedent eleven weeks before death could be added to
decedent's estate; trust was illusory); Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937) (assets placed in
revocable inter vivos trust by decedent could be added to decedent's estate and used to satisfy surviving
spouse's elective share). Note that these cases have involved bare attempts to disinherit spouses, rather
than to donate wealth to charity, although Sullivan states that motive does not matter:
The rule we now favor would treat as part of "the estate of the deceased" . . . assets
of an inter vivos trust created during the marriage by the deceased spouse over
which he or she alone had a general power of appointment, exercisable by deed or
by will. This objective test would involve no consideration of the motive or
intention of the spouse in creating the trust. . . . Nor would we have to participate in
the rather unsatisfactory process of determining whether the inter vivos trust was,
on some standard, "colorable," "fraudulent," or "illusory."
Sullivan, 460 N.E.2d at 577.
11 See generally John R. Cunningham, Mortmain Statutes: The Dead Hand Still Survives, 27
IDAHO L. REv. 49 (1990); Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise ofMortmain in the United States, 12
Miss. C. L. REv. 407 (1992). For an example of a relatively recent case applying a mortmain statute after
its repeal, see In re Estate of Kirk, 907 P.2d 794 (Idaho 1995).
"See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 5704 (West 2011). Compare this to Denmark, another country
rejecting clawbacks, in which gifts causa mortis may only be made by will. See note 49 supra.
"' The UPC offers considerably more complexity than this, including two alternative treatments
of marital property:
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and administration expenses and certain other exemptions and claims. 140 While the
UPC has been adopted in only a minority of states' 4 ' and with significant local
(a) Subject to Section 2-208, the value of the augmented estate, to the extent
provided in Sections 2 204, 2 205, 2-206, and 2 207, consists of the sum of the
values of all property, whether real or personal, movable or immovable, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated, that constitute:
(1) the decedent's net probate estate;
(2) the decedent's nonprobate transfers to others;
(3) the decedent's nonprobate transfers to the surviving spouse; and
(4) the surviving spouse's property and nonprobate transfers to others.
(b) The value of the marital-property portion of the augmented estate consists
of the sum of the values of the four components of the augmented estate as
determined under subsection (a) multiplied by the following percentage:
If the decedent and the spouse
were married to each other: ............ The percentage is:
Less than 1 year ......... .......... 3%
1 year but less than 2 years ..................... 6%
2 years but less than 3 years ..................... 12%
3 years but less than 4 years ........................ 18%
4 years but less than 5 years ........................ 24%
5 years but less than 6 years ........................ 30%
6 years but less than 7 years ........................ 36%
7 years but less than 8 years ........................ 42%
8 years but less than 9 years ................... 48%
9 years but less than 10 years ...................... 54%
10 years but less than 11 years .................... 60%
11 years but less than 12 years ................ 68%
12 years but less than 13 years ................ 76%
13 years but less than 14 years .................... 84%
14 years but less than 15 years .................... 92%
15 years or more ........ ............... 100%
[Alternative Subsection (b)for States Preferring a Deferred-Marital-
Property System]
[(b) The value of the marital-property portion of the augmented estate equals
the value of that portion of the augmented estate that would be marital property at
the decedent's death under [the Model Marital Property Act] [copy in definition
from Model Marital Property Act, including the presumption that all property is
marital property] [copy in other definition chosen by the enacting state].
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2 203 (amended 2008), [8 Pt. I] U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 2010).
'o See John P. Ludington, Determination of and Charges Against, "Augmented Estate" upon
iwhich Share of Spouse Electing to Take Against Will is Determined under Uniform Probate Code § 2-
202, 63 A.L.R.4th 1173 (1988 & Supp. 2010) (addressing the pre-1990 version of UPC § 2 202, now
replaced by § 2-203).
141 The UPC has been adopted, at least in part, in Alaska (Alaska Stat. §§ 13.6.5-13.36.100),
Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§14-1101-14-7308), Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-10-101-
15-17-102), Florida (Fla. Stat. §§ 655.82, 711.50-711.512, 731.005-731.302, 735.101-735.302,
737.101-737.512), Hawaii (Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 539-1-539-12, 560:1-101-560:8-101), Idaho (Idaho
Code Ann. §§ 15-1-101-15-7-307), Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 18 A. §§ 1-101-8-401), Michigan
(Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 700.110- 700.8102, §§ 701.1-713.6), Minnesota (Minn. Stat. §§524.1-101-
124.8-103), Montana (Mont. Code Ann. §§72-1-101-72-6-311), Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§30 2201-
30 2902), New Mexico (N.M. Stat. §§45-1-101-45-7-522), North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code §§30.1-01-
01-30.1-35-01, South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. §§35-6-10-35-6-100, 62-1-100-62-7-604), South
Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws §§29A-1-101 29A-8-101, and Utah (Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-1-101-75-8-
101) (1969 version of UPC).
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variation,142 a few non-UPC states have also adopted the concept.143 And inter vivos
gifts to a potential heir may in some situations be deducted from that person's
intestate, testamentary, elective, or pretermitted heir share. 144
The concept of the augmented estate is only necessary if there is a forced heir
whose share may be assessed against it. (Other valuations of the estate are used for
other purposes, such as assessing estate tax.) 14 And, as noted above, even the
clawback is not outside the contemplation of the UPC. Section 2-209 provides:
(c) ... If, after the application of subsection (a), the elective-share amount
is not fully satisfied, or the surviving spouse is entitled to a supplemental
elective-share amount, amounts included in the decedent's net probate
estate, other than assets passing to the surviving spouse by testate or
intestate succession, and in the decedent's nonprobate transfers to others
under Section 2-205(1), (2), and (3)(B) are applied first to satisfy the
unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount or the supplemental
elective-share amount. The decedent's net probate estate and that portion
of the decedent's nonprobate transfers to others are so applied that liability
for the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount or for the
supplemental elective-share amount is apportioned among the recipients
of the decedent's net probate estate and of that portion of the decedent's
nonprobate transfers to others in proportion to the value of their interests
therein.
(d) . . . If, after the application of subsections (a) and (c). the elective-
share or supplemental elective-share amount is not fully satisfied, the
remaining portion of the decedent's nonprobate transfers to others is so
applied that liability for the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share or
supplemental elective-share amount is apportioned among the recipients
of the remaining portion of the decedent's nonprobate transfers to others
in proportion to the value of their interests therein. 146
In other words, the decedent's inter vivos gifts may be reached to satisfy the
surviving spouse's elective share. For example, assets placed in a charitable
remainder trust "may be included in the augmented estate and, therefore, may be
used to determine and satisfy the elective share amount." 147
142 See, e.g., Payne v. Stalley, 672 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("We cannot rewrite
Florida probate law to accommodate a Michigan attorney more familiar with the Uniform Probate
Code.").
1
4 See William Winter, UMPA Fights for Recognition, AM. BAR Assoc. J., June 1984, at 76, 77-
78.
1 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21135(a) (West 2011).
14 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2035(b) (West 2011) (including gifts made within three years prior to death
in the value of the decedent's estate).
.4. UNIFORM PROB. CODE §2 209 (amended 2008), [8 Pt. I] U.L.A. 88 (Supp. 2010); see, e.g.,
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5 (West 2011) (allowing the decedent's stepchildren to look back to assets
attributable to the decedent's predeceasing spouse and parent of the decedent's stepchildren).
14 Lawrence P. Katzenstein, Charitable Remainder Trusts: Charity Can Begin at Home, in
CHARITABLE GIVING TECHNIQUES 51 (2007). See generally Grayson M.P. McCouch, A Comment on
Unification, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 499, 499 n.13 (2008) ("[t]he elective share is satisfied first
from amounts passing to or already owned by the surviving spouse. Only if those amounts are insufficient
are other beneficiaries liable for the deficiency, and liability is apportioned ratably except for two narrow
categories of transfers occurring during marriage and within two years before death."); Jeffrey N. Pennell,
Minimizing the Surviving Spouse's Elective Share, 32 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 9-1 (1998) (claiming that most
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The scope of the elective share, however, is far less in the United States than in
continental Europe. In most of the European legal systems examined above the main
goal seems to be to keep assets in the line of descent, almost as if they were entailed.
In those U.S. states that have elective share statutes, the statutes protect spouses, not
children, parents, or other heirs; they are more an extension of marital property
concepts than of heirship concepts. Although, homestead and family allowance
statutes, where present, may provide some protection for other family members as
well as for spouses. All U.S. states but one provide some mechanism to guarantee
the surviving spouse a share in the estate. Although in theory community property
states have no need for separate elective share statutes, as community property rules
serve the same purpose, they tend to have at least partial equivalents nonetheless. 148
Among the separate property states deriving their marital property laws from English
common law, Georgia has no elective share statute.149 The lone civil law state,
Louisiana, remains a somewhat ambiguous case.5o The elective share in the United
States is thus a more modern form of the English law of dower and curtesy. Dower
gave a surviving widow a life estate in one-third of her deceased husband's freehold
property; curtesy, most inequitably, gave a surviving widower a life estate in all of
his deceased wife's freehold property, where there were issue of the widower and his
wife born alive." Dower and curtesy themselves still exist, in somewhat modified
form, in Arkansas, Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio.152 At common law, interestingly,
spouses would acquiesce in an estate-equalization QTIP trust rather than elect against the will), cited in
Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an Income -Inclusion
System, and Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REv. 551, 577 n.95 (2003); Lawrence
W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code's Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1, 9-11 (2003).
"'See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21610-12 (West 2011). But note that a decedent can explicitly
disinherit a spouse, id. § 21611(a), and that inheritance rights may be waived during the decedent's life by
the spouse, for example by a prenuptial agreement, id § 21611(c).
1"JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING § 10.03(4)
(3d ed. 2006).
150 See, e.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Remnant ofForced Heirship: The Interrelationship of
Undue Influence, What's Become ofDisinherison, and the Unfinished Business of the Stepparent
Usufruct, 60 LA. L. REv. 637 (2000) (discussing the extent to which forced heirship still exists after
legislative changes in the late 1990s).
5 See, e.g., McGee v. McGee, 91 111. 548 (lll. 1879); Richardson v. Richardson, 64 S.E. 510,
511-13 (N.C. 1909).
152 ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 28-11-101 28-11-405 (2004); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§392.010-
392.140 (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§558.1-558.92 (2006) (community property
excepted, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.214 (2006)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2103.01-2103.08,
3105.10 (West 2005) (dower rights for both spouses; curtesy abolished, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2103.09
(West 2005)). In addition, statutorily-created rights in other states may be essentially identical to
common-law dower under other names and minus, of course, the explicit common-law gender bias.
Consider, for example, Connecticut:
(a) On the death of a spouse, the surviving spouse may elect, as provided in
subsection (c) of this section, to take a statutory share of the real and personal
property passing under the will of the deceased spouse. The "statutory share"
means a life estate of one-third in value of all the property passing under the will,
real and personal, legally or equitably owned by the deceased spouse at the time of
his or her death, after the payment of all debts and charges against the estate. The
right to such third shall not be defeated by any disposition of the property by will to
other parties.
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freeholds given inter vivos by the husband were potentially subject to clawback to
satisfy dower rights. 153
Other factors, not least the financial and emotional cost of an inheritance battle,
may act as a surrogate for forced heirship in the U.S.: "forced heirship and systems
of community marital property serve the same function as the undue influence of
restricting excessive impecunious gifts outside the family and protecting the natural
recipients of the testator's bounty." 15 4 In particular, "the impact of the undue
influence doctrine is to act as a form of forced heirship.""' In addition, pretermitted
child (or issue) statutes provide a partial equivalent, as do pretermitted spouse
statutes. However, as with a spouse, the child may be explicitly disinherited, or
may not be entitled to the protection of the statute for a variety of reasons; i5 it is by
no means as powerful a tool for the testator's descendants as civil law forced
heirship. Note also that, under a pretermitted child statute, the pretermitted child may
be entitled to a larger share of the estate than those children mentioned in the will.
Pretermitted (or, in the case of the UPC, "omitted") child statutes, however,
protect only against unintentional disinheritance; in every state except Louisiana, a
testator may intentionally disinherit a child. Louisiana's constitution protects
children's inheritance rights through the state's civil law tradition of legitime and, to
some extent, forced heirship. While forced heirship for ascendants is abolished, the
constitution states:
The legislature shall provide for the classification of descendants, of the
first degree, twenty-three years of age or younger as forced heirs. The
legislature may also classify as forced heirs descendants of any age who,
because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking
care of their persons or administering their estates. 158
But even in Louisiana, a child can be intentionally disinherited for "just cause," as
defined by statute. 159
(b) If the deceased spouse has by will devised or bequeathed a portion of his
or her property to his or her surviving spouse, such provision shall be taken to be in
lieu of the statutory share unless the contrary is expressly stated in the will or
clearly appears therein; but, in any such case, the surviving spouse may elect to take
the statutory share in lieu of the provision of the will.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-436(a)-(b) (West 2011); see also Daliav. Lawrence, 627 A.2d 392 (Conn.
1993).
151 See, e.g., Hall v. McBride, 416 So.2d 986, 989 (Ala. 1982) ("At common law, a widow who
was not satisfied with the portion her husband gave her in his will, could seek a writ of dower unde nihil
habnut against the tenant of the freehold. If she established her right to the writ, she assigned her dower to
the sheriff Finally, an action of ejectment was brought against the current land holder.").
154Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative Analysis, 19
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 41, 81 (2008).
15 Roy D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REv. 571, 611 (1997).
151 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21620-23 (West 2011); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (2006).
1 Id
'LA. CONST. art. 12, § 5(B); see also LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1493 (Supp. 2011).
"'LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1621(A) (Supp. 2011).
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Ill. WHY IT MATTERS
The differences between the treatments of forced heirship and clawbacks in the
Anglo-American and civil law traditions have existed for centuries. Only recently,
however, have these differences become a problem. The increasing mobility of
peoples worldwide, and especially the free movement of persons within the
European Union, is one cause. A second is the increasing individual and societal
wealth that has made a culture of retirement possible. The combined effect of these
two is that many people do and will continue to grow old and die in countries other
than those in which they were born, acquired their wealth, and had children. In
particular, many persons from the north of Europe, including the United Kingdom,
choose to retire in the more clement south of the continent. To further complicate
matters, it is now relatively simple to acquire property and financial interests in other
countries, without leaving one's home let alone one's country of residence.
Millions of Europeans now live outside their countries of citizenship and
millions more have financial interests abroad.1o The European Commission, in
adopting the E.U. proposal on cross-border inheritances, pointed out that there are
"450,000 international successions opened in the E.U. every year ... estimated by
some to be worth more than EUR 120 billion."1 61 The U.S. foreign-born population
of over thirty-seven million includes nearly five million born in Europe,162 and non-
European countries also apply forced heirship. In Colombia, for example, the reserve
or legitim may account for three-fourths of the fictive hereditary mass, and
clawbacks are possible.163
IV. THE E.U. PROPOSAL
The most administratively appealing long-term solution to any international
conflict of laws is also the most politically impossible (and, perhaps, undesirable):
harmonization of national laws to eliminate the differences. Even in areas where the
advantages are obvious, such harmonization can be difficult. For example, the
harmonization of copyright law, measured from the foundation of the Association
Litt6raire et Artistique Internationale in 1878 to the time the last three major
holdouts (the United States, China, and Russia) became parties to the Berne
Convention,164 took well over a century.'6 ' And relatively few people in any country
1.oSee EUROPA JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS-SUCCESSION AND WILLS STUDY 4 (2005),
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/publications/docs/testaments-successions summary en.pdf; Addendum I,
supra note 18, at 19.
161 Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, The Commission Proposes to Simplify the Settlement of
International Successions and to Make the Rules Governing Them More Predictable (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1508&format=HTML&aged 1&1anguage
=EN&guiLanguage-en; see also Simplification ofRegulation on International Successions, supra note
16; Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposalfor a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of
Decisions and Authentic Instruments in Matters ofSuccessions and on the Introduction ofa European
Certificate ofSuccession, SEC (2009) 411 final, at 5 (Oct. 20, 2009), available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/stl4/stl4722-ad02.enO9.pdf [hereinafter Addendum 2].
12 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2010 tbl. 43 (2010).
13 See C.C. H§ 1242-45 (Colom.).
.. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T.
1341 (last revised July 24, 1971).
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hold copyrights of any value; nor does copyright touch deeply-held cultural values
concerning the relationship of the individual, the family, and society. Death, in
contrast, touches every individual in every country. Even so, the harmonization of
copyrights achieved after more than a century of diligent efforts remains imperfect
and requires constant adjustment.
A global law of inheritance is thus unlikely. Even the European Union, with its
enhanced ability to bring about regional harmonization of laws, acknowledges that
"[a]s full harmonisation of the rules of substantive law in the Member States is
inconceivable, action will have to focus on the conflict rules."166 It disavows any
intent to bring about a harmonization of substantive domestic laws regarding
inheritance: "[t]his initiative is aimed neither at replacing nor harmonising
succession law, property law or family law in the Member States." 67 Any
harmonization would thus apply only to trans-boundary inheritance cases; national
law and inheritance cases without a trans-boundary aspect which in most countries
are probably still the majority of cases would remain unaffected.i1s But even this
may prove impossible: because most of the countries of the E.U. draw their
inheritance laws from the civil law tradition and because that tradition is so greatly at
odds with U.K. expectations, achieving any compromise palatable to both sides is
likely to prove unusually difficult.
In the earlier stages of the process, few seemed to perceive the magnitude of the
problem. The 2005 E.U. Green Paper comments blithely that "[t]he legal systems of
all the Member States protect the near relatives of a deceased person who tries to
disinherit them. The protection commonly takes the form of a reserved portion of the
estate but the mechanism is not recognised everywhere in the European Union."'169 In
fact, the legal system of the United Kingdom does no such thing, beyond the
protections the Inheritance Act provides against being left in poverty. 1 70 The House
of Lords responded to the Green Paper with alarm, identifying certain "'red lines,
which European legislation should not cross if it was to be acceptable to the UK."' 7'
115 The United States became a party in 1989, China in 1992, and Russia in 1995. Neither the
Soviet Union nor the government of Taiwan, formerly recognized by the United States and many other
countries as the government of China, had been parties to the Convention. Some other relatively large
economies have joined more recently, including Saudi Arabia and Vietnam in 2004; the most recent state
to become a party is Yemen, in 2008. See generally Parties to the Berne Convention, WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResultsjsp?countryid=ALL
&start_year-ANY&endyear=ANY&search what=C&treatyid=15 (last visited May 24, 2011).
16Commission Green Paper: Succession and Wills, at 3, COM (2005) 65 final (Mar. 1, 2005).
16 Simplification ofRegulation on International Successions, supra note 161.
168 Nonetheless, there seems to be a certain regret in the Commission's tone: "[a]lthough their
harmonisation remains outside the competence of the European Community, it is important to understand
that the starting point for the problems currently faced by citizens are the national substantive rules on
successions which diverge widely between the Member States." Addendum 2, supra note 161, at 2.
" Commission Green Paper: Succession and Wills, supra note 166, at 6.
'o Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, c. 63, §§ 1 2; see note 134
supra, and accompanying text.
171 U.K. HOUSE OF LORDS EUR. UNION COMMITTEE, H.L. PAPER 75, 6TH REPORT OF SESSION
2009-10: THE E.U.'s REGULATION ON SUCCESSION 8 (2010), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/1d200910l/dselect/ldeucom/75/75.pdf [hereinafter SIXTH
REPORT]; see also MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN
UNION 10-12 (2007), in U.K. HOUSE OF LORDS EUR. UNION COMMITTEE, H.L. PAPER 12,2ND REPORT OF
SESSION 2007-08: GREEN PAPER ON SUCCESSION AND WILLS (2007), available at
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In the view of the committee's expert, "[t]he problem of clawback features more
heavily than any other issue in the responses." 172 The committee "agree[d] that the
first, if not the most important, red line in the present context relates to the issue of
so-called clawback. The Union measure should not in any way call into question the
validity of otherwise valid inter vivos dispositions."1 73
Private-sector non-profit groups in the United Kingdom were, not surprisingly,
alarmed. 174 The House of Lords Committee took their part and continued to point out
its unwillingness to countenance clawbacks:
This is the single most contentious issue in the proposal for the UK. . . . In
the law of England and Wales and that of Northern Ireland there is no
forced inheritance and therefore no clawback. Nor will the courts entertain
a claim for clawback even if they are applying a law which includes it. 175
The E.U. proposal, the Lords noted with alarm, would change this: "[u]nder
Article 19(2)0) of the proposal, clawback claims would specifically be within the
scope of the applicable law and therefore would operate in the UK when the law
being applied to a succession provides for clawback."1 76 Dire consequences might
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/d200708/ldselect/ldeucom/12/12.pdf (Supplementary Letter
from Lord Grenfell, Chairman of the European Union Comm., to Bridget Prentice MP, Parliamentary
Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Oct. 25, 2007)) [hereinafter Supplementary Letter from
Lord Grenfell].
172 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION 5
(2007), in U.K. HOUSE OF LORDS EUR. UNION COMMITTEE, H.L. PAPER 12,2ND REPORT OF SESSION
2007-08: GREEN PAPER ON SUCCESSION AND WILLS (2007), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/d200708/ldselect/ldeucom/12/12.pdf (response of Professor
Jonathan Harris to Question 17).
1
7
3 Supplementary Letter from Lord Grenfell, supra note 171.
'4 See, e.g., Celina Ribeiro, European Clawback' Law Threatens 'Massive Losses' for UK
Charities, CIVIL SOC'Y FUNDRAISING (Nov. 25, 2009),
http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/fundraising/news/content/5610/european-claw.
1' SIXTH REPORT, supra note 171, at 25. The sole exception in the United Kingdom was
Scotland, and that was in all likelihood a purely theoretical one: "[i]n Scotland there is forced inheritance
in respect of moveable property, but the evidence to us was that clawback either did not exist in the UK or
was only very limited." Id. at 25. Other reports underscored these concerns:
The Government is supportive, in principle, of the Commission's aim to simplify
rules and procedures related to cross-border inheritance. However, the solutions
that have emerged in the proposed Regulation do not seem to be sympathetic or
compatible with the legal traditions of all Member States, in particular the common
law system. An initial assessment of the proposed Regulation has identified a
number of key concerns, particularly in relation to the issue of clawback (discussed
later in this assessment) and on the key connecting factor (which is the link which
identifies the deceased to a particular country for the purpose of allocating court
jurisdiction and identifying the law of succession that will apply to such
proceedings.) The Government believes these provisions are likely to have a
significant impact on the legal traditions of the UK, possibly entailing adverse
costs.
U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN COMMISSION PROPOSED REGULATION
ON "JURISDICTION, APPLICABLE LAW, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS AND AUTHENTIC
INSTRUMENTS IN MATTERS OF SUCCESSION AND THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN CERTIFICATE OF




SIXTH REPORT, supra note 171, at 25.
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result, including insecure title to gifts and to property received from donees,
difficulty in valuing such assets, increased legal complexity and costs, and
undermining of trusts, insurance policies, pensions, and title registries.
The House of Lords report provides a hypothetical "extreme example":
A British national domiciled in, and entirely connected with, England
gives away a significant proportion of his property. Forty years later he
dies, having moved to France, having become domiciled, bought property,
married and raised a family there.
The forced inheritance claims and clawback will apply to the gifts
made when he was domiciled in England as far as French law is
concerned. They are liable to be returned to the estate to meet these
claims. 178
In a sense, the problem already exists: the surviving relatives of such a person could
already bring an action in France under French law.179 But, given the U.K. courts'
unwillingness to "entertain a claim for clawback," the U.K. donees and their
successors would remain secure in their possession of the donated property, whether
the action was brought in France and enforcement later sought in the United
Kingdom, or whether it was brought in the United Kingdom-as long as the United
Kingdom was not required to apply French clawback law. Even in the United
Kingdom, however, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act of
1975 allows courts to set aside inter vivos gifts if made within six years of death
with the intention of defeating a claim under the Act. "
While the clawback is the most contentious issue-the brightest of the red
lines-there are others: the E.U. proposal would invade several other areas of law in
which the United Kingdom differs significantly from the majority of its fellow E.U.
Member States, including "administration of estates and questions relating to the
validity and operation of testamentary trusts, matrimonial property law, and interests
terminating on death such as joint tenancies."'i
Given these apparently insurmountable obstacles to agreement, the United
Kingdom has decided not to opt-in to the E.U. proposall8 2 but is continuing to keep a
careful eye on its evolution.13 Denmark, another E.U. Member State outside the
civil law tradition, has also chosen not to opt-in.184
The E.U. proposal, as it currently stands, 1 5 contains multiple references to the





.. See notes 59-62 supra and accompanying text.
"' SIXTH REPORT, supra note 171, at 26.
... Supplementary Letter from Lord Grenfell, supra note 171; see also SIXTH REPORT, supra note
171, at 8.
182 SIXTH REPORT, supra note 171, at 8.
183 Id. at 9.
14EU Proposal, supra note 1, pmbl. 36.
Id; see also Addendum 1, supra note 18; Addendum 2, supra note 161.
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The validity and effects of gifts are covered by Regulation (EC) No
593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome 1). They should
therefore be excluded from the scope of this Regulation in the same way
as other rights and assets created or transferred other than by succession.
However, it is the law on succession determined pursuant to this
Regulation which should specify if this gift or other form of provisions
inter vivos giving rise to an immediate right in rem can lead to any
obligation to restore or account for gifts when determining the shares of
heirs or legatees in accordance with the law on succession.186
In other words, if the applicable law under the choice-of-law rules set forth in the
proposal permits clawbacks, then the gift may be clawed back. The decision on
whether a gift should be clawed back would be made by a court of the country that
was the habitual residence of the decedent, 1 which would (ordinarily) apply its own
law.i'8 When the law of another state is to be applied, only that other state's rules of
substantive law, not its choice-of-law rules, will be applied, avoiding renvoi. 189
Article 27, however, all but guarantees that the proposal will remain
unacceptable to the United Kingdom. States may refuse to apply the law of another
state "only if such application is incompatible with the public policy of the
forum,"o90 which might appear to give the United Kingdom an out, as clawbacks
seem incompatible with U.K. public policy. But Article 27 goes on to qualify this
exception: "[i]n particular, the application of a rule of the law determined by this
Regulation may not be considered to be contrary to the public policy of the forum on
the sole ground that its clauses regarding the reserved portion of an estate differ from
those in force in the forum."'191 The "clauses regarding the reserved portion of an
estate" include the ways in which the reserve is calculated and in which it may be
satisfied-in other words, they include clawbacks, in countries permitting them. A
U.K. court would thus be unable to refuse to apply the clawback laws of, say, France
on public policy grounds. Under these provisions, it would even be mandatory to
apply the laws of non-E.U. members, if dictated by the choice-of-law rules.1 92
Nor is this the only reason that opting in might subject U.K. donee beneficiaries
and their successors to clawbacks. Under the proposal, once a court in the decedent's
state of habitual residence has issued a decision possibly requiring clawbacks-all
other Member States (that is, other E.U. Member States that have opted-in) 193 would
116 EU Proposal, supra note 1, pmbl. 9.
M Id. art. 4 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of this Regulation the courts of the Member State
on whose territory the deceased had habitual residence at the time of their death shall be competent to rule
in matters of successions.").
"' Id. art. 16 ("Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to the
succession as a whole shall be that of the State in which the deceased had their habitual residence at the
time of their death.").
"' Id. art. 26 ("Where this Regulation provides for the application of the law of a State, it means




'9 Id. art. 27(2).
192 d. art. 25 ("Any law specified by this Regulation shall apply even if it is not the law of a
Member State.").
19' "In this Regulation, 'Member State' means all the Member States with the exception of
Denmark, [the United Kingdom and Ireland]." Id art. 1(2).
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then be obliged to recognize that decision.19 4 Although a few grounds for non-
recognition are set forth in Article 30, clawbacks alone would not justify non-
recognition. These grounds permit a state to refuse to recognize a judgment in
certain situations if entered against a person who did not appear,195 if it was entered
against a person not served with process, 196 or if it is inconsistent with another
decision between the same parties. 19 7
U.K. courts (or the courts of any Member State) would not only be required to
recognize these judgments but also to enforce them.198 Moreover, they would have
no power to review the substantive decision-the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the foreign court.' 99 Opting in to the proposal would thus inevitably place
the United Kingdom in the position of having its courts enforce clawbacks decreed
by foreign courts against U.K. subjects.
Choosing not to opt-in provides only limited protection. Courts in other states
can, and will continue to be able to, decide inheritance cases in ways that adversely
affect the interests of U.K. subjects, including clawbacks against U.K. donees and
their successors. While those judgments may not be enforceable in U.K. courts, they
will be enforceable not only in the courts of the country entering the judgment
(where they would have been enforceable in any event) but also, under the proposal,
in the courts of most other E.U. member states.
V. CONCLUSION: HOW DOES THIS AFFECT THE UNITED STATES AND
OTHER NON-E.U. COUNTRIES?
The E.U. proposal, as it currently stands, is clearly unacceptable to the United
Kingdom and seems to have been drafted in blatant disregard of the United
Kingdom's concerns. The conflict with United States law is less drastic, and the E.U.
has no obligation to take into account the law of the United States or any other non-
member state. Nonetheless, the problem now facing the United Kingdom faces the
rest of the non-E.U. world as well.
"' Id. art. 29 ("A decision given pursuant to this Regulation shall be recognised in the other
Member States without any special procedure being required.").91Id art. 30(a) ("A decision shall not be recognised ... (a) where it was given in default of
appearance, such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which
recognition is sought, it being understood that the public policy criterion may not be applied to the rules of
jurisdiction").
"' Id. art. 30(b) ("A decision shall not be recognised ... (b) if the defendant was not served with
the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in
such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence
proceedings to challenge the decision when it was possible for him to do so").
1' Id. art. 30(c)-(d) ("A decision shall not be recognised ... (c) if it is irreconcilable with a
decision given in a dispute between the same parties in the Member State in which recognition is sought;
(d) if it is irreconcilable with an earlier decision given in another Member State or in a third State
involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier decision fulfills
the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed.").
"'Id art. 33 ("Decisions given in a Member State and enforceable there and legal transactions
shall be carried out in the other Member States in accordance with Articles 38 to 56 and 58 of Regulation
(EC) No 44/2001.").
"'Id art. 31 ("Under no circumstances may a foreign decision be reviewed as to its substance.").
474 [Vol. 17
OF CHARITIES AND CLAWBACKS
The House of Lords, considering the proposal, posed a hypothetical question
involving real property in the United States:
A separate issue of scope is the extent to which any EU instrument should
apply to non-Member States; for example. to determine the governing law
where the testator died habitually resident in the UK but having a house in
Florida. We discussed the pros and cons with Professor Harris. A key
consideration, in our view, would be whether the Community had
competence to prescribe a rule having extra-Union consequences. It will
not surprise you that the Committee takes a strict view of the scope of
Article 65 TEC and we note that the new Article 69d proposed by the
Reform Treaty refers to "civil matters having cross-border implications".
The instrument would therefore not apply on the facts posited above to
property outside the Union.200
This seems, perhaps, overly optimistic. Real property is a special case, being by its
nature immovable and thus permanently located within the jurisdiction of a single
state. Given the inherent difficulties involved in deciding the title to real property
located in the territory of another sovereign, many legal systems instead choose to
recognize the state in which that property is located as the authority on title to that
property.201
A better question might be what would happen where the testator who died was
a habitual resident in, say, France (the United Kingdom not having opted-in to the
E.U. proposal), leaving valuable personal property in Florida. If the French court
awarded the property to A while under Florida law it went to B and B had other
personal property in France (or in any of the other E.U. Member States that had
opted-in to the proposal), there seems no reason to assume B's European assets
would be safe from attachment to satisfy the French judgment. Similarly, the U.S.
(or other non-E.U.) donee beneficiary, having assets in Europe, of a person
habitually resident in an E.U. state allowing clawbacks might find its European
assets attached to satisfy a clawback judgment against the donated assets in the U.S.
As noted above, this is already possible where the assets and the court decreeing the
clawback lie within a single country; the effect of the E.U. proposal will be to
expand the number of countries in which assets might be vulnerable to the same
clawback.
The question, as always, is one of degree rather than of kind. Attempted
clawbacks, an extraordinary and unusual device available in some U.S. states under
some circumstances, may begin to show up more frequently as foreign claimants or
U.S. claimants seek to enforce forced heirship rights under foreign law against U.S.
donees. The process is likely to be a gradual one and, in any event, can be addressed
as it becomes a problem. A more likely undesirable consequence is not that
clawbacks may become an actual problem for the U.S., but that the increased
possibility of clawbacks may act as a deterrent to some donors.
200 Supplementary Letter from Lord Grenfell, supra note 171.
2 0 1 But see, e.g., Addendum 1, supra note 18, at 12 ("Example: An Italian citizen dies in England,
leaving a house there. English courts will apply English succession law (law of the place of location).
Italian courts would apply Italian succession law to the whole estate including the house in England.").
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